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DISTRIBUTION II

Attached is a story by Richard Burt appearing in this morning's New York Times in which he asserts that several intelligence specialists here in Washington are of the opinion that the White House "narrowly missed" coming out of the Shaba affair with a serious credibility gap. He also claims the episode created deep strains between the White House and the Agency.

Lesson of Shaba: Carter Risked Serious 'Credibility Gap'

By RICHARD BURT

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 10 — On May 25, when President Carter accused Cuba of having backed the attack by Katangans on Zaire's southern province of Shaba, some intelligence officials doubted that the Administration had conclusive evidence to support the allegation.

News Analysis Most of the officials, interviewed in recent weeks, agreed that subsequent information on the attack, which began May 11, tended to substantiate Mr. Carter's statement. But at least one high official continued to question the assertion, and others acknowledged that the initial intelligence on the nature and extent of Cuban involvement was inconclusive when the Government made the matter public.

Accordingly, while intelligence specialists are now satisfied that Mr. Carter was correct in asserting that Cuba was deeply involved in training and supplying the invaders, several say in private that the White House narrowly missed coming out of the affair with a serious credibility gap.

Limitations in Political Arena

The Defense Department's senior intelligence official, Adm. Daniel J. Murphy, hinted at this when he said in a speech that the incursion was "an example of the limitations of intelligence in making a political point." In little-noticed remarks to the National Military Intelligence Association, Admiral Murphy also said that the Administration still lacked "what the press would term hard, conclusive, publicly available evidence or proof of Cuban involvement."

Several experts see in the whole affair a series of troubling questions concerning the Administration's use, and possible abuse, of intelligence in conducting foreign policy. The questions include these:

Did the Director of Central Intelligence, Adm. Stansfield Turner, in an attempt to respond to the White House's policy needs, exercise proper caution in assessing early reports of Cuban involvement?

Were Mr. Carter's advisers, intent on drawing the line against Soviet and Cuban advances in the region, too eager to make political capital out of the Central Intelligence Agency's findings?

Why did the White House choose to engage in an open dispute with President Fidel Castro over the issue of Cuban involvement when it was unwilling or unable to make evidence public to support its case?

These questions have set off intense debate in intelligence circles, and Congressional aides report that Senator Birch Bayh, chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, has ordered an investigation of the Administration's performance in the affair.

White House-C.I.A. Strains

At the same time the episode is said to have created deep strains between the White House and the C.I.A., with intelligence officials arguing that Presidential aides, in an effort to back up Mr. Carter's contentions, put pressure on the agency to divulge classified information that could have jeopardized sensitive sources. White House officials, for their part, complain that at the outset the agency exaggerated the Cuban role and was unable to provide the President with hard proof with which to back up his statement.

Intelligence information has often played a vital role in efforts by American administrations to build support for controversial foreign policy decisions. In 1962, for example, President John F. Kennedy used photographic evidence to justify his naval blockade of Cuba. Two years later, President Lyndon B. Johnson used intelligence to support his decision to invade the Dominican Republic.

in an effort to gain Congressional support for escalating the war in Vietnam, said that an intercepted radio message proved that North Vietnamese gunboats had attacked two American warships in the Gulf of Tonkin.

Risk in Strong Allegations

With regard to Shaba, the officials pointed to two factors that, they said, made it risky for the Administration to make strong allegations concerning Cuban involvement. The first is that Zaire and Angola, where the incursion originated, are classified as intelligence-deprived areas, meaning that before and during the incursion intelligence specialists never had a clear picture of what was going on. The officials said that in May few American reconnaissance satellites and listening devices were focused on the region and that intelligence reports were based almost exclusively on data gathered from African diplomats, agents from other nations and prisoners taken by French and Belgian paratroopers who moved into Shaba in response to the attack.

"What we had," an analyst recalled, "was just a steady accumulation of evidence, some of it contradictory, that built up through the first week of June. What we lacked was any single piece of intelligence to convince the skeptics."

The second factor posing problems for the Administration was the confusing and fast-shifting situation in southeastern Zaire, the scene of almost two decades of constant insurgency. The Katangans, exiled to Angola after the civil war in the former Belgian Congo in the early 1960's, were equipped and trained by Cuban advisers in late 1975 to take a part in the post-independence conflict in Angola that led to the formation of Agostinho Neto's Marxist Government. Although Dr. Neto's victory increased the difficulty of Western intelligence collection in Angola, American analysts believed they had evidence that Cuba continued to provide training and support for the Katangans and hoped them carry out their first invasion of Shaba, in March 1977.